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        This research project presents a resilience, governance, and vulnerability analysis of 
populations traditionally considered as non-vulnerable to natural disasters and climate related 
events.  The paper examines how homeowners in Sea Gate, a neighborhood located on 
Coney Island, in Brooklyn, New York, experienced systemic disruption following Hurricane 
Sandy.  This research sets out to answer the following questions:  How does the lived 
experience of homeowners in a coastal community reflect the creation of newly vulnerable 
populations in regard to natural disasters in New York City?  How is the current municipal 
resilience strategy being perceived as managing these shifts?  And finally, what avenues does 
this discourse open to better prepare resilience strategists to accommodate the needs of 
citizens on the front lines of climate risk in a major city such as New York? Currently, 
resilience planning in New York City is focused on shoring up the region’s economic 
hotspots and areas of high urban activity, but vulnerable residential coastlines throughout the 
city are being left to fend for themselves under these present policy initiatives. Open-ended 
interviews were conducted with residential homeowners in Sea Gate who were adversely 
affected by Hurricane Sandy, i.e. experienced economic and property loss because of storm 
damage, to elucidate this dichotomy.  The paper argues that the current state of perceived 
vulnerability exceeds both the historical governmental capacity for an organized response to 
future natural disasters following Hurricane Sandy and the perceived priorities of the 
municipal administration.  Thus, the paper demonstrates that resilience planning is a political 
process and must consider the perspectives and needs of citizens in coastal communities to 
ensure more equitable and representative policies are enacted to protect such households 
from future damage due to institutional unpreparedness. 
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Coastal Resilience as a Conceptual Framework 
        In the present era of hyper-awareness both to the uncertain nature of our changing 
climate and the recurrent nature of major natural disasters, resilience has emerged as a 
guiding principle within the policy sphere for those seeking to ensure future stability for at-
risk regions and population centers. As Meerow et al. point out, the annual number of 
citations regarding “resilience” as a framing issue have skyrocketed since 2006.  However, 
they claim that the rise in use of the term has been steadily accompanied by an equally large 
number of definitions.  This very malleability could possibly be why the term itself is so very 
attractive to various parties.  They warn, however, that this ubiquity could prove problematic, 
for if its endless malleability is abused, the term could be rendered meaningless or too 
confusing, in a similar fashion to past buzzwords such as sustainability.  For example, the 
malleability of the term could potentially serve as a facilitator to interdisciplinary 
collaboration, though on the other hand, if every field has its own internal definition it could 
stifle this process.  In the present moment, the tentative nature of a unifying definition still 
has the potential to make it difficult to fully operationalize the concept. (2016) Nonetheless, 
an increasing number of experts are beginning to hone in on a central definition that can be 
credibly reiterated amongst various sources.  In its 2012 report on resilience building, 
USAID states that resilience can be defined as “the ability of people, households, 
communities, countries, and systems to mitigate, adapt to, and recover from shocks and 
stresses in a manner that reduces chronic vulnerability and facilitates inclusive growth” 
(USAID 2012: 5). Meanwhile, this same definition can also be evidenced in the writing of 
Neil Adger where he defines resilience as, “the capacity of linked social-ecological systems 
to absorb recurrent disturbances such as hurricanes or floods so as to retain essential 
structures, processes, and feedbacks.” (Adger et al. 2005) A similar definition can be found 
across a range of publications (Walker et al., Kreimer et al., NOAA, the IPCC, Klein et al.). 
This paper employs Brown et al.’s definition of resilience. They state that resilience can be 
classified as: 
“The capacity of an individual, community or institution to dynamically and 
effectively respond to shifting climate circumstances while continuing to function at 
an acceptable level. This definition includes the ability to resist or withstand impacts, 
as well as the ability to recover and re-organize in order to establish the necessary 
functionality to prevent catastrophic failure at a minimum and the ability to thrive at 
best. Resilience is thus a spectrum, ranging from avoidance of breakdown to a state 
where transformational change is possible” (2012). 
        While the myriad definitions of resilience touch on the same points, ultimately 
reproducing a comprehensive image of resistant and adaptable systems, which can shift and 
adapt to disruption and change. Yet, they all neglect a key point.  None of these definitions of 
resilience explicitly discuss the resilience of smaller groups of individuals within larger 
wholes.  Systems, either urban or ecological, occupy most of the space in discourse on 
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resilience at the present moment. While systemic and infrastructural resilience is indeed 
important, it is only possibly when the whole is as strong as the sum of its parts, and the 
people on the ground, the residents of those most geographically and environmentally 
vulnerable points of habitation, must be accounted for in any coherent policy enacted with 
the intent of creating a more resilient community of any kind.  Therefore, smaller 
communities who face immediate risk from coastal vulnerability must be better investigated 
in order to deepen this discourse.  It is to elucidate this notion that this paper will venture to 
Sea Gate to describe the stories of the people there. 
        Amidst this backdrop, the City of New York states that it desires to be a resilient city 
that is: “...first, protected by effective defenses and adapted to mitigate most climate impacts; 
and second, able to bounce back more quickly when those defenses are breached from time 
to time.” (NYC 2013) To understand where this framing emerges from within the regional 
context, one must look to the definitions available from actors involved with New York 
State, such as Judith Rodin, President of The Rockefeller Foundation.  In her text, she defines 
resilience stating: “Resilience is the capacity of any entity—an individual, a community, an 
organization, or a natural system—to prepare for disruptions, to recover from shocks and 
stresses, and to adapt and grow from a disruptive experience…You also develop a greater 
capacity to bounce back…”  (Rodin 2014).  The similarities are striking.  It cannot be 
overlooked that Rodin indeed played at least some role in the formulation of policy emerging 
from New York State as a whole. Her own biographical statement on The Rockefeller 
Foundation “about” pages states that, “In November 2012, New York Governor Andrew 
Cuomo named Dr. Rodin to co-chair the NYS 2100 Commission on long-term resilience 
following Superstorm Sandy” (TRF). The NYS 2100 was the first major policy initiative to 
be launched in New York State after Superstorm Sandy, and as such, it heavily informed and 
inspired the revised PlaNYC document which would emerge the following year. 
        Emerging policies and rhetoric frame resilience as a dichotomy between the City as 
represented by the administrative or governing body at the front lines and the natural 
disasters that will lead to crisis, not necessarily factoring in the actual citizens who lie in that 
path of potential danger.  All three iterations of New York’s policy packages: PlaNYC: A 
Greener Greater New York, PlaNYC A Stronger more Resilient New York, and Mayor 
DeBlasio’s One New York partake in this narrative.  For examples of how these concepts are 
currently playing out, we can look at two major international endeavors on this front.  Both 
the 100 Resilient Cities program and the C40 Cities initiatives stand out as benchmarks.  In 
the case of 100 Resilient Cities, their self-stated mission is: “100 Resilient Cities—Pioneered 
by the Rockefeller Foundation (100RC) is dedicated to helping cities around the world 
become more resilient to the physical, social and economic challenges that are a growing part 
of the 21st century.” (100resilientcities.org). Here again, Rodin’s Rockefeller perspective is 
evident.  New York City was the first metropolis to join the network, and its net benefits 
included gaining a Chief Resilience Officer, support for the development of resilience 
strategies, and access to a vast partner network. (100resilientcities.org) Quite similarly, C40 
bills itself in a similar fashion, stressing its network of over 80 cities, it’s supposed 600 
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million constituents and an active involvement with a full quarter of the global economy. 
(C40.org/about) Primarily, then, C40 sees itself as a city created and city led initiative to 
further the cause of urban green-economy conversion.  
        Thus, the grand narrative of city administrations versus the vagaries of coming crisis 
ends up becoming the overarching story behind urban resilience.  In this tale, cities form vast 
networks, often with the help of major financial institutions, such as banks or private equity, 
creating markets of resilience.  Though “stakeholders” and multilateral decision making are 
touted on paper as instrumental to true resilience, the power to control and formulate policy 
flows in the standard direction from the state or private sector down to the people. Another 
pertinent statement Rodin published on The Rockefeller Foundation website reads, “…It 
requires upfront investment both in terms of financing and resources. It requires innovation 
to solve for known vulnerabilities but also for variables unknown. And it takes partnerships 
with the private sector, both to uncover weaknesses within systems, but to also unleash the 
full range of financing for resilience projects and infrastructure.”  It continues, “Resilience 
should be a positive selling-point that cities volunteer to attract the best and the brightest, just 
as they might promote their livability scores, vibrant arts scene or new transportation 
investments”.1  The truth of the situation, however, depends on where along the chain of 
command one sits.  To those authoring policy, it may seem that forward thinking initiatives 
are well underway.  To those people whose homes sit outside of the limelight, and whose 
vulnerability to coastal encroachment and natural disasters increases with each passing year, 
like the residents of Sea Gate, progress toward increased resilience is perceived as slow, 
when it is perceived at all. 
 
Coastal Resilience Policy in New York City 
        In order to achieve its vision of “Our Resilient City”, the current New York resilience 
policy document clearly states the priority of the policy is to achieve three goals.  These are, 
“Eliminate disaster-related displacement of more than one year of New Yorkers from homes 
by 2050; reduce the Social Vulnerability Index for neighborhoods across the city; and reduce 
average annual economic losses resulting from climate-related events.” (One New York 214) 
These seem, on the surface, to be noble enough causes.  However, one must question by what 
means exactly they could be achieved in unison. Furthermore, a general air of vague 
optimism dogs the sections that discuss actually ensuring future resilience.  For instance, this 
introductory passage closes with the statement that adaptation is needed and the situation is 
dire, though hope is not all lost, because the opportunity to buy down future risk still exists if 
the proper investments are made forthwith. (One New York 218) 
        This sensibility permeates much of the policy package, as time and again, economically 
incentivized initiatives are cited as progress where substantive physical improvements to city 
                                                          
1 https://www.rockefellerfoundation.org/blog/realizing-resilience-dividend/ 
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infrastructure or potential resilience are difficult to discern. For example, many initiatives 
within the document can seem arbitrary, or metric-motivated rather than well considered or 
impactful. In one case, rather than explaining a specific plan of action, the city cites the, 
“RISE: NYC, a $30 million competition that leverages innovative resiliency technologies in 
energy infrastructure, telecommunications, and building systems for small businesses.” 
(ONY 226)  When researching what exactly this is, one sees that it is indeed a competition 
intended to foster innovation in partnership with the private engineering firm Buro-Happold 
in conjunction with the New York City Economic Development Corporation or NYCEDC, 
without stated benefits or outcomes.  Most troublingly, and most specific to this study, this 
shallow strategy is being employed in the actual formulation of infrastructural interventions 
for coastal protection.  While discussing “Vision 4” or “Coastal Defense” the document lays 
out goals for the next 10 years ranging from flood protection systems, levee installation, 
investments in vulnerable coastal communities, energy improvements and so-called “nature-
based” measures. (ONY 246) However, it commits to none and avoids a detailed explanation 
of how the city plans to execute these highly complicated and logistically advanced 
initiatives.  Instead, one becomes party to a wild goose chase of donor-network relations 
which indicate a complex web of funding with little tangible presence yet, now nearly five 
years post-Sandy.   
      New York is at a critical impasse, as progress towards resilience would hopefully indicate 
that New York City would be better equipped today to deal with an event such as what 
happening in October 2012.  Unfortunately, both these policy packages and current 
administrative behavior indicate that this may not be the case.  For example, although the 
municipal government of New York City may state that their goal is to “…continue to align 
zoning and building code updates with reforms to the National Flood Insurance Program and 
expected changes to the Flood Insurance Rate Maps.” (One New York 232) They are fighting 
tooth and claw to not fulfill this promise in real-time.  In June, 2015 the Office of the Mayor 
filed an appeal against FEMA’s most recent update to those very same maps.  In the appeal, 
the Mayor’s Office argues that the city disagrees with the methodology that FEMA has 
employed, leading to a measurement of flood projections the city finds unacceptable.  The 
Office asserts, “Specifically, FEMA’s Preliminary FIRMs overstate Base Flood Elevations 
(BFEs) by more than 2 feet in many areas across New York City and misrepresent the 
Special Flood Hazard Area (SFHA) by 35 percent, unnecessarily putting approx. 26k and 
170k residents in the SFHA” (Office of the Mayor 2). As of October 17th, 2016, it seems that 
the Mayor’s office won its appeal, as FEMA and the Mayor made a joint announcement to 
redraw the floodplain maps, placing tens of thousands of homes along the coast in low-risk 
zones.  
        This re-zoning belies a paradoxical mindset within the municipal government. This 
dishonesty, be it malicious or otherwise, will ultimately result in the uneven distribution of 
negative outcomes from future flooding.  If zones which are indeed at risk are listed as lower 
than suggested risk, what will stop current and future policy from simply overlooking the 
need to protect these spaces?  This situation resonates with what Burby calls the “safe 
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development paradox” that exists “when federal efforts to make inherently hazardous areas 
safe for development in fact make them highly susceptible to disasters of catastrophic 
proportions.” (2006) And as he demonstrates, this would go on to have severe consequences 
for vulnerable populations across New Orleans during Hurricane Katrina. 
      This paper adds to the dialogue on resilience and governance by focusing on the 
perspectives and stories of homeowners on the front lines of coastal vulnerability. Resilience 
is being touted by proponents in the Office of the Mayor and private organizations such as 
The Rockefeller Foundation as a dynamic and useful tool in the face of the many challenges 
laid out before coastal cities.  Through the language and actions of current administrations 
and the investors and formulators who affect their policy, it is clear that grand narratives and 
large scale maneuverings are being undertaken.  The findings of this paper will demonstrate, 
however, that the current state of resilience planning in New York City does not reflect the 
perceptions of vulnerability and need expressed by members of a coastal community within 
its bounds. 
 
Environmental Instability as a Challenge to Governance 
        Climate change is a multilateral issue which presents the global community with many 
challenges.  Primarily, adapting to changing environmental dynamics and potential instability 
arising from the political and economic dimensions of environmental crisis whilst also facing 
the geographic disruption of population centers due to shifting coastlines are key issues. Here 
a conceptual framework of resilience can be a guiding force for potential change. One of the 
most prescient examples of this scenario is the current and future state of sea-bound 
metropolises, i.e. cities such as New York, Boston or Miami. 
        What does a changing climate mean for coastal cities?  Both real-time events and the 
current literature paint an alarmingly clear picture. Hurricane Sandy and its aftermath 
demonstrated the weakness of New York’s infrastructure to large scale flooding and the 
disruption it brings. As Pirani and Tolkoff state, “It flooded key arteries in and out of New 
York City, including the Brooklyn-Battery Tunnel and Amtrak’s Hudson River tunnel. It 
disabled power plants and transmission lines, leaving 8.5 million customers in three states 
without electricity, some for weeks. The storm surge easily overtopped protective dunes and 
floodwalls from Atlantic City to New London, damaging more than 600,000 homes and 
killing 60 people.” (Pirani et al. 2014) Then Mayor Bloomberg’s policy response PlaNYC: A 
Stronger More Resilient New York that, “Along the shoreline the storm surge smashed 
buildings and engulfed entire communities. It flooded roads, subway stations, and electrical 
facilities, paralyzing transportation networks and causing power outages that plunged 
hundreds of thousands into darkness. Fires raged. Wind felled trees. Heartache and 
hardship—and at least $19 billion in damage—are the storm’s legacy.” (NYC 2013) This 
state of unpreparedness is nothing new.  The gross level of infrastructural and governmental 
failure in the face of full-scale natural disaster was first on display in this way nearly a 
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decade prior during Hurricane Katrina.  Finally, the United States Senate stated in their 
executive report Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared that:  
“1) Long term warning went unheeded and government officials neglected their 
duties to prepare for a forewarned catastrophe; 2) Government officials took 
insufficient actions or made poor decisions in the days immediately before and after 
landfall; 3) Systems on which officials relied on to support their response efforts 
failed; and 4) Government officials at all levels failed to provide effective 
leadership.” (2006: 2) 
A pattern of government failure is well-documented with a number of scholars theorizing its 
root causes. For some, bureaucratic bloat is often cited as an impediment to efficient 
governance in times of crisis. As Sobel and Leeson state, layered bureaucracies and 
centralized decision making are inherently slow and delay action.  In many instances, this 
sluggishness is beneficial and desired for governance, i.e. when implementing changes to the 
law facilitates stability and the maintenance of stable legal environments.  However, this 
proves a double-edged sword, as even then Governor of Louisiana Kathleen Blanco 
complained that it was impossible to break through this bureaucracy even at the highest level. 
(2006) 
        In other cases, either an incidental or willful lack of attention to potential hazards on the 
part of governing bodies is seen as attributing to the eventual failure. For example, Raymond 
J. Burby states that what he terms the local government paradox occurs when local 
authorities give insufficient attention to the threats posed by hazards when they willfully 
allow continued development of potentially or known hazardous areas.  In turn, the burden of 
human suffering and financial ruin is then felt most heavily by the citizens when disasters 
occur.  He points out that this was plainly illustrated in New Orleans where the municipal 
government actively supported heavy development in the eastern portion of the city, whilst 
the Orleans Parish Levee Board remained staunchly unwilling to underwrite flood and 
hurricane protection despite the known danger. (2006) Overall, the risk is clear. There is no 
indication that the occurrence of storm events such as Sandy, and as such the need for 
municipal policy to meet them, will diminish. In fact, current research shows that the 
opposite will prove to be true more quickly than is currently thought.  As Reed, et al. (2015) 
state, pre-anthropogenic to current anthropogenic era rates of storm surge and flooding have 
increased alongside rates of sea level rise, with the mean flood height having increased by 
over 1.24 meters in that time.  In addition, the changes to tropical cyclone activity brought on 
by environmental shifts have also led to an increase in the severity of storms which produce 
surges for New York City, yielding a net increase in flood risk for the region (2015). 
However, the present state of government preparedness to deal with repeat events has yet to 
be demonstrated in any meaningful sense. 
        These precedents, combined with the troublesome disconnect between what resilience 
means to policymakers and what is required of it to serve coastal populations, creates a 
defining political incoherence surrounding the governmental response to Hurricane Sandy in 
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New York.  The problematizing issue at the heart of the governmental capacity to cope with 
these responsibilities can be witnessed in the unearned political certainty of policy produced 
by the municipality and the State to meet challenges that present as clear a danger to 
constituents in vulnerable communities as they did before a single dollar was pledged to 
resilience, but for whom little has changed five years later.  Such is the case in communities 
across the City who occupy space on exposed coastline, of which Sea Gate is one. 
 
Sea Gate: The Research Setting 
        For its features as a private gated community as well as being at the fore of the coastal 
turmoil that Hurricane Sandy brought, I chose Sea Gate located on the western shore of 
Coney Island in southern Brooklyn, New York as the research site.  My status as a former 
resident who was present for the unfolding of Hurricane Sandy itself, uniquely positioned me 
to conduct interviews and navigate the community as an insider without the need for a 
gatekeeper. Here I provide background information on the community of Sea Gate itself, and 
its status in regard to the governance, vulnerability, and resilience of city space. 
        Sea Gate is a private gated community. Land was development for what would 
eventually become Sea Gate began in 1892 then known as Norton’s Point.  The name came 
from the lighthouse that still stands there today.2 During Hurricane Sandy, Sea Gate alone 
saw roughly 750 homes damaged to differing degrees at an overall cost of $45 million to 
residents.  Not only was private property laid to waste, but external structures which served 
as protection for the community, like the main bulkhead on the point, were destroyed during 
the storm (Kensinger 2014). A unique feature of the damage that Sea Gate saw, beyond 
merely that it occurred within an atypically private community, is the length of time it has 
taken to recoup losses and rebuild.  As Kensinger further points out, “Very little has changed 
here in the past two years, and the landscape is littered with boarded up homes, empty lots 
and abandoned construction projects.” (2014) This was an account made some years ago, 
though now, in 2017, the situation has not evolved much further.  Despite the fact that 
various sources point to pledges made by the city or federal government to improve storm 
resistance in the area, there has been no perceptible progress on the ground.  This includes a 
$2.8 million dollar grant for sea-wall construction which Kensinger eluded to in 2014, but 
whose link on the Governor's Office of Storm Recovery is no longer operating.  Also of note 
are endeavors such as New York Rising which the New York Times cited in 2014 as 
pledging $200 million to communities across the region but whose effects are imperceptible 
to homeowners. 
        Meanwhile, though private communities exist all over the nation, they are rare within 
the boundaries of greater New York City.  The characterization and status of private 
communities sets them apart from the surrounding area both in an ideological sense and in a 
                                                          
2 This lighthouse was the last civilian-manned lighthouse in the United States. 
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direct governmental manner. In Private Communities or Public Governments: "The State 
Will Make the Call", Rishikof and Wohl state: 
“From the few progressive and utopian communities of the late nineteenth century, to 
the early suburbanite developments at the beginning of the twentieth century, to the 
growing popularization of organized community development in the middle of this 
century," experiments in urban planning and building private communities have 
existed in some form, albeit generally as a small percentage of cities or towns. 
Homeowner's associations, for instance, have a long history in this country and 
abroad. More recently, particularly in the last thirty years, amidst the fear of spiralling 
crime and the dual developments of urban decay and urban gentrification, Americans 
have turned increasingly to the security and style of life offered by private 
communities, neighborhoods, and living associations" (1996: 512) 
        As a private community, the governance status of the space in a city which traditionally 
has heavy municipal oversight is somewhat convoluted.  One such homeowner’s association 
as mentioned above oversees the internal administration of the community.  This is the Sea 
Gate Association.  While residents pay city and state taxes as any New Yorker typically 
would, they also pay dues to the Sea Gate Association.  Meanwhile, while services like 
Sanitation or Emergency Medical Transport are handled by the external services upon which 
Brooklyn residents would normally rely, an independent Police force oversees the day to day 
security and emergency response duties within the gates. As Rishikof and Wohl note: 
“This dramatic change in the dynamics of community living presents the possibility 
not only of physically reshaping neighborhoods and towns, but also restructuring 
systems of community and interpersonal interaction, legal rights, and personal 
responsibilities. At best, these communities may seem like idyllic living locales, 
which serve to "enhanc[e] the sense of neighborhood identity and community."' These 
efforts to achieve utopia, however, may also support communities which spur the 
development of an "us versus them" mentality, keeping distance (and walls) between 
those who are perceived as either economically, socially, or racially different” (1996: 
515) 
        In the case of Sea Gate, this problematic occurrence centers more on an us versus them 
narrative between the homeowners within the community, the Sea Gate Association, and the 
municipal government at large in ways which will become elucidated further in the paper.  
This liminal status can and will cause contention over the maintenance and responsibility 
towards land, property and emergency response both in times of disruption and day to day 
policy. 
 
Methods & Methodology 
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        Methodologically, my approach to this research largely dwells within the lens of 
interpretive knowledge creation, recognizing the lived experience of vulnerability to coastal 
disaster, assessments of government response, and knowledge of climate change and 
resilience policy through the testimonies of residential homeowners within the target 
neighborhood. 
        One-on-one interviews with the researcher (myself) and willing participants were 
conducted between June and December 2016.  The main subject population was residential 
homeowners who were adversely affected by Hurricane Sandy, (i.e. experienced economic 
and property loss as a result of storm damage). Individual informants were selected based on 
the location of their residence within Sea Gate.  Snowball sampling was also used to find 
additional participants.   
        As a former resident of Sea Gate, I have first-hand knowledge of where storm damage 
occurred.  I used this knowledge to inform my sampling strategy. I also used photographic 
and documentary evidence of storm damage throughout the community. These sources of 
data helped me to create a purposeful sampling strategy that focused on depth of a 
respondent’s experience rather than on completing as many interviews as possible.  
Interviews were conducted independently with each chosen participant by myself at a place 
of the participant’s choosing.  Interviews were recorded digitally and stored until such time 
as it could be transcribed.  From this point transcriptions were arranged in groupings with the 
aim of elucidating illustrative quotes which could carry the most prescient themes from the 
data forward.  From here, coding categories were deduced which best suited the themes 
which recurred across the transcripts. 
        Respondents speak for themselves.  Thusly, while I entered this research with guiding 
interview questions, I did not enter with a pre-conceived coding framework.  Rather, I 
produced deductive codes which evolved from the data.  In this way, I was best able to 
capture the essence of what parties to whom I spoke relayed, and distilled it into academic 
arguments.  
        When considering subjectivity, I am a former resident of the community to which I am 
returning in order to conduct research.  I was present during Hurricane Sandy and my own 
family experienced both extensive property damage and temporary displacement.  Therefore, 
due to my biography, I was well positioned to conduct this study.  Not only am I familiar 
with the subject matter, but also well versed in the social dynamics of the neighborhood. 
        Regarding the ethical dimensions of this study, the research did not involve any 
significant risks for the subjects.  The questions pertained mostly to matters of vulnerability 
perceived through a lens of private property and fiscal effects and governance issues 
associated with post-Sandy response.  There were no fatalities in Sea Gate during Hurricane 
Sandy.  Questions did not seek to create personal profiles of individuals. Rather, the focus of 
the interview questions was to build towards a more communal understanding of how 
respondents view the issues of vulnerability and governance as a collective whole once data 
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is collected.  Therefore, no personal or political information regarding respondents was 
included in the study unless where specifically required or requested by the respondent 
themselves.  Furthermore, participants were free to cease engagement with the study at any 
time.  That being said, without divulging enough information for anonymity to be breached, 
some facts can be laid out about participants.  Interviewees were middle to older-aged, 
Caucasian, and while both male and female individuals were consulted, the majority of 
participants were male.  These trends were not due to any intentional canvassing or 
preference for the study, but rather the result of who was available and willing to participate 
at the time of my research. 
 
Findings and Discussion 
        In the course of data analysis, a narrative emerged from the responses garnered during 
interviews.  This narrative places Sea Gate, or at the very least, representative residents 
within the community, in the position of occupying a dynamic and nebulous space in the 
landscape of New York City when considering governance, disaster relief, and ultimately, 
resilience planning. 
        Three main themes emerged from the data.  Namely, issues of Governance, 
Vulnerability and Resilience stood as meta-categories for coding purposes.  Under the 
umbrella of Governance, sub-codes included Institutional Coordination, Infrastructural 
Management and Beach Maintenance.  Under the category of Vulnerability, sub-codes 
included Fiscal Effects and Geographic Factors.  Meanwhile, under the meta-category of 
Resilience, the main sub-codes which emerged were Climate Awareness and Knowledge of 
Policy. 
Governance 
Institutional Coordination – Infrastructural Management 
        One of the primary findings of this endeavor was that a common belief existed among 
interviewees that the level of Institutional Coordination present in the immediate and 
lingering aftermath of Hurricane Sandy was subpar in many respects.  Not only was the 
official municipal response from Greater NYC perceived as limited and ineffectual, but the 
local response from the authorities present both on Coney Island and within Sea Gate itself 
was seen as relatively piecemeal or unclear.  To establish this in the present, however, it is 
necessary to examine how this belief has underpinnings in past experience as well.  It was 
reflected by several statements made by an interviewee that they had carried a latent distrust 
of the ability of the state to care for them in times of crisis.  Indeed they stated: 
“I did not expect to have any support services and the reason I evacuated and urged 
my neighbor to evacuate was because of seeing Katrina victims on their rooftops. I 
did not have faith in our community being able to provide support because of our 
location. Geographically, I live on an island, and the bridge may have not been 
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accessible, it may have been destroyed. In the previous year, during Hurricane Irene 
situations, neighborhoods were dramatically effected with flooding and we were very, 
very lucky not to be hit. We were prepared and we evacuated but nothing happened. I 
had a sense of complacency about the severity of the storm but I still evacuated 
because I knew things were getting worse with the storms and with the services. 
We’ve had snowstorms in which our community could not be dug out for four days, 
you know, creating problems with access to transportation, ambulance[s] and work, 
so being in that situation frequently made me cognizant of the fact that if I did not 
evacuate I would be leaving myself open to whatever could happen.” 
Furthermore, in regards to the status quo of infrastructure it was evidenced in several 
statements that this sense of service disruption or potential service bias existed as a sort of 
cursory baseline.  This is present in the following statements: 
“Yes at times. We did have electrical problems, and Bus service was actually 
discontinued by the New Yok City transit system in Sea Gate, requiring residents to 
walk or drive to access the rest of the transit system.  So it was always a difficult 
commute to get to the subway…” 
And: 
“The infrastructure is limited, the services they provide, but I would expect that 
because we pay the same property taxes as everyone else in NYC, whatever services 
everyone else is entitled to, we should have, that we are getting that? No.” 
Or: 
“This is a unique….when you are talking about Sea Gate, it’s like, as far as I’m 
aware, this went back with Giuliani, when he said, you know, take down the gates, 
the Reagan-esque thing, and then you have services.  People want to keep their 
privacy but then they charge us the same property taxes so we are paying for 
nothing.” 
Another respondent offered a more tempered but still problematizing view: 
“I wouldn’t say there was a complete failure of services, but I would say that what I 
saw was a lot of struggling on the part of the city to, you know, respond. They were 
overwhelmed.” 
Even something as fundamental as regular phone access was perceived as not wholly 
reliable: 
“Not having the need for any specific services, the answer to that would be no, not 
necessarily. But the only thing that’s bad here, as you know, is the telephones. For 
some reason that and the electricity, with this locale I think it has to do with wires 
being above ground and not underground, something along that line…” 
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Due to this perceived lack of confidence in the ability of state actors or organizations to 
necessarily be “on the ball”, members of the community to whom I spoke entered Hurricane 
Sandy without much faith in the City or any of its preventative measures to stop the worst 
effects of storm fallout.  Rather, most of the participants prepared for Sandy with the vague 
hope that the storm would simply pass like so many before it and that an act of chance would 
be their saving grace. 
        Meanwhile, in the actual wake of the storm, the respondents perceived major gaps in 
services provided with one exception.  The sanitation department appeared to be actively 
functioning better than the police force and various emergency response services as one 
interviewee stated: 
“The only agency that I saw that actually functioned well was the sanitation 
department. Because they picked up garbage, they came around, the guys were 
empathetic, they got guys in from Queens that were working, they said ‘oh geez’ you 
know.  I don’t recall seeing any other except for the Hasidic “police” but they all 
went to the members, you know that didn’t pertain to me, but they were patrolling 
and they knew we lived here but they were a private organization because you know 
our police organization was gone. Did a private organization take up the slack? Yes, 
they knew we lived here. But that was about all.” 
Another participant confirmed this when they said: 
“The police told us that we had to watch out, that there were looters around out the 
other side of the fences.  They were spread too thin, they couldn’t actively patrol 
everything, and their headquarters had been wiped out by the storm surge.  When I 
think back to that, it makes me think about getting some sort of self-defense for the 
future.  No-one was there to protect anyone, and we didn’t have any power.” 
However, it was not as if knowledge of the potential danger from the sea was without 
precedent.  Certainly, storms had caused intermittent disruption before, though it had been 
some time since major damage had been inflicted by weather related events.  One participant 
stated: 
“In 1991, December 11 or 12-13th, we had a severe storm in which our residence was 
hit by waves at the level of the second floor. We were ordered to evacuate but we did 
not heed the orders to evacuate.  On the ocean side of the community a house fell into 
the ocean and it was a pretty scary thing to experience.” 
And while this precedent existed, it was not as if any set protocol or plan was in place for 
residents should flooding occur again.  Ordering evacuations was perceived ‘well and good’, 
but it did not belie a deeper level of planning or coordination.  As one respondent states: 
“Right now, they’re not going to do anything over here. That’s basically it. That’s 
why that’s an interesting point.  If you were to get the New York Times in here, are 
we the only community in the United States that faces this? [It’s a] possibility.” 
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This sense of idleness existing on the part of the “powers that be” feeds into the 
aforementioned cycle of mistrust which exists between Sea Gate residents and the 
municipality at large.  However, where this mistrust may exist as an above average level of 
skepticism during times of stability, during a crisis it can easily be observed as transforming 
into a more palpable sense of fear, where it presents clear existential threats.  Take, for 
example, this account, where one respondent describes the experience of homeowners 
throughout the community being hassled by suspicious men claiming to be city employees 
sent to inspect the electrical fuses in houses. Not only were they charging money for said 
inspections but they were armed with the threat that homes could not be reconnected to the 
grid without performing one: 
“The criminality…you know my plumber came back here and said it looked like 
Algeria where he had come from.  He said now that the water is gone, watch, the 
‘sharks’ are going to come out. They were pulling out…you know people got caught 
that were gullible, they all claimed they were federal workers but who knows what 
they were.  So the sharks came out, now were they sanctioned by the government? It 
would apparently seem so, so some of them were legitimate sharks.  But you didn’t 
know which ones. Would I have known not to let the guy look at my box, the 
electrician and let him put a thing on it?”  He came 12 o’clock at night saying to put it 
on you know, ‘oh we gotta take it out you were flooded you’re in an A zone’…” 
        Ultimately, this all feeds into Sea Gate’s status as a gated community in Brooklyn, 
which complicates its position in the grand scheme of things during times of stability, let 
alone in the wake of a natural disaster.  This relationship emerged as a persistent obstacle to 
governance in the area, where respondents seem to perceive a complicated system of 
mismanagement existing both between themselves and the Sea Gate Association and 
between the community itself and the rest of New York proper.  Consider this statement: 
“The only thing you could do, see, if you focus on those issues, I guarantee you, you 
could get all the local newspapers to write articles on that.  Because they are totally 
unaware of what is going on, because nobody knows that Sea Gate exists, you see, 
and the Board, the mentality is that we don’t want anybody to know, and if they know 
we’re going to wind up getting punished, and having been on the Board, getting 
punished for what? To the best of my knowledge we’re paying city dues and Sea Gate 
dues, and if you have a single family house, your Sea Gate dues you can’t deduct. 
They don’t even know, they’re chopping off their foot to battle their toes.” 
Here we have not only a demonstration of the perception that Sea Gate and its residents are 
unseen or invisible to the city itself, but also that they shoulder a greater burden, paying 
taxes/dues both to the city at large and to the local administration for the upkeep of the 
community, but receiving little perceptible benefit for the trouble.  In particular, the interplay 
between the New York City government and Sea Gate’s own administration is relevant to 
this discourse because it effects how responsibility is partitioned for certain services and 
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infrastructural oversight within the bounds of the gates.  One respondent points out in regard 
to the history of sanitation services in the community: 
“And then I said, how come we have sanitation? I looked at the history, looking at the 
history of Coney Island and it only ever touches peripherally on Sea Gate, but if you 
go back and look at the stuff…where did…how did…what happened in the early 
‘60’s was there was a deal made…but a deal made by whom, in writing? Where? 
Where is the document that says we are getting sanitation, because basically if we are 
a private community we shouldn’t be, so they don’t want to bring that thing up 
because it might affect snow plows, it’s one or the other. So they’re thing is its better 
not to open up that one, and since he [Sea Gate Board chairman] opened up the door 
in other places, I have no problem opening up the doors other places too.” 
From this kind of narrative also emerges a latent sense of frustration against the local Sea 
Gate Association in regard to their stewardship of this public/private relationship, where they 
are interpreted as acting advantageously in some regards and underperforming in others.  One 
statement reads: 
“And here are the other problems, with our quasi status, we’re neither fish nor fowl, 
since, you know, when I was on the board you know and people say ‘Oh they’re 
robbing money!’, well if they are they would have to be very smart because I didn’t 
see it, but if you want to say oh they’re stupid, they’re arrogant, yeah I could see 
situations where that occurs.” 
Intrinsically, this frustration seems to constitute an underlying dispute over whose 
responsibility certain actions normally overseen by government in one form or another are, 
with several parties potentially being culpable in various situations, whilst none emerge to 
take up this mantle.  This, in turn, is then perceived as all actors involved washing their hands 
of any accountability and leaving problems unresolved. 
Vulnerability 
 Fiscal Effects & Geographic Factors 
        The main narrative regarding fiscal effects throughout the respondent pool was one of 
extensive damage that was costly but possible to recoup one way or another.  The difficulty 
experienced by each household differed primarily around how much time and effort was 
invested in either obtaining financial compensation or physical labor to rebuild.  However, 
cause to celebrate was scarce as all respondents bore an awareness that the open-ocean facing 
homes bore incredible damage, some being swept completely away, and worry over future 
damage is still high.  Meanwhile, narratives also emerged that painted a picture of insecurity 
around the external framing of the vulnerability within the community, citing fears that 
preconceptions about wealth and stability would prevent protective measures from being 
taken in the future. 
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        On the one hand some respondents were quite content because they received coverage 
from their private insurance: 
 “They wouldn’t cover some things but it didn’t matter because they covered 
everything else.” 
Or: 
“My experience was really, compared to everybody else, OK, you know going to 
court and fighting, but then I wasn’t looking to make any money on this deal, I just 
wanted to go on with my life. I came to retire to a beach in Brooklyn, you know, I 
look at the grass grow. That’s just the way it is.  This is the perfect place for sedentary 
people.” 
However, others still had serious qualms over how federal aid was administered, saying they 
were lucky they had private insurance because Federal aid never came.  In one case, a 
respondent asserted that they perceived a socio-economic bias at play in the way FEMA 
responded to certain households, in their view: 
“Private Insurance. I got no Federal, I was not entitled to any Federal compensation 
because, you know, I worked for fifty years.  This Federal compensation, FEMA and 
all that, because we have to be…they don’t pay, which is the same thing with FEMA, 
the only way that they pay with FEMA is if you find some flaw. We were entitled to 
200 or 500 dollars, there was really nothing for a person like me because they told me 
I could pay, therefore there was nothing for me, the flood didn’t affect me in their 
eyes.” 
And again, a mock conversation with FEMA was requoted: 
“Why are you prejudiced against me? [Addressing FEMA] Aren’t I a victim? 
[FEMA] ‘Yeah but you can afford it.’” 
Even still exasperation was expressed at being denied coverage by a contractual technicality 
which they interpreted as unethical and hostile.  Part of their statement was: 
“The only thing I could think of…as outstanding issues is the sand…not now but in 
the years to come.  The only other thing is I did get screwed with the insurance on the 
Auto but that had to with that I had leased a car. And I knew someone who worked at 
GM and she told me, ‘Yeah, I knew that was in their contract but I never saw anyone 
get hit with it’ but I got hit with it. And I mean even an attorney, no one would think, 
oh that clause is going to cost you 7,000 dollars, and I had the car in the garage.” 
While this extreme was not present across the entire group of respondents, it is important 
enough to stand out in that it demonstrates another layer of disconnect between the 
community of Sea Gate and the greater area of New York and southern Brooklyn to which it 
belongs.  Whether real or perceived, such divisions will have an effect going forward on the 
ways in which homeowners in the area feel their needs are being considered. 
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        A consistent narrative of intense physical damage emerged from the data, with 
homeowners recounting how much had been lost, in terms of space and time.  One 
respondent stated: 
“What can I say? The whole lower floor was inundated, the water came up higher 
than it ever had before in recent memory.  The permanent structure was intact but the 
entire first floor had to be gutted and rebuilt…I did all of the reconstruction myself, 
the walls needed to be rebuilt with mold resistant boarding, the electricity had to be 
rewired completely….its a project that is never finished, I’m still working on it to this 
day.  I think of time often as before and after Sandy now, given the impact it had.  
This is not even to mention the possessions we lost because we couldn’t take 
everything upstairs…decades worth of things, some of them irreplaceable…gone.  
Even to this day, I will pick things up and move them downstairs and water from 
Sandy will spill out, stuff that’s been trapped for years now, its like it hasn’t fully 
left.” 
Indeed, the fiscal aspect of this experience has been equally enduring, where the process of 
receiving compensation is still underway: 
“Oh sure, the private insurance didn’t give us trouble after they came to inspect the 
house, though it took some time.  I remember the day, it was so cold it was flurrying 
and we still did not have electricity, this was in November after the storm, we were 
using a propane heat lamp to warm the house to keep the cold and damp at 
bay…prevent mold…But the FEMA compensation is still coming in to this day, just 
in the past few months we have received more in the mail from them.  Its great, but if 
we had been reliant on that assistance [alone?] we would have been out of luck.” 
It is imperative to note that while the respondents I spoke to were, on the whole, financially 
capable of withstanding the cost of the damage dealt, many in other parts of the community 
were not, and are now gone because they could not rebuild, especially on the ocean-facing 
side of the island.  The socio-economic characteristics of Sea Gate are not homogenous, and 
while there are areas of the community which house more financially secure households, 
there are many more which are middle-income on a varying level.  In this regard, the great 
equalizer herein is the geographic position of the community as a whole, and when 
formulating resilience policy for future scenarios, this category cannot be overlooked. 
       While the fiscal aspect of the community’s vulnerability is important, perhaps the most 
vital and problematic aspect of Sea Gate’s vulnerability are the inherent geographic facts of 
its existence. In turn, this geographic reality feeds back into the fiscal viability of the 
community itself. The most immediate and obvious aspect of this positionality is the ever 
present risk of flood waters.  One respondent stated: 
“One of the problems here, right, and I saw just in Sea Gate, with the water in the 
street, you know the reason there was water in the street.  It didn’t come from my 
house, because once it came in, you know we live on a slab, [name] lives on a slab, it 
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came in and it went out. Now [name] and everyone else who had basements, it didn’t 
come out. Now if you’re going to find out what FEMA is going to pay and in the 
meantime it causes mold problems……Why do they build on the beach, that was 
absolutely ridiculous, and no insurance pays for stuff in the basement anyway, so in 
other words how do you resolve that problem?  We could pay….but what about the 
person who inherited the property and they can’t even pay insurance or even live in a 
house like this, so that’s another problem that the Federal Gov’t., you know anytime 
you make regulations and have a big brother thing you create problems.  The only 
thing you could do is that anyone who lives in any area like this must have insurance. 
You know when I was buying this my lawyer said to me make sure you have flood 
insurance, don’t worry about the mortgage.” 
This sentiment is further echoed in another statement: 
“People who are actually….you shouldn’t have a house on the beach if you can’t 
afford it, but for people who inherit it or don’t have insurance. It’s a problem how do 
you resolve it? You punish one to reward another? Is that a solution to a problem?” 
Furthermore, worries over the state of flood insurance and proximity to the water were 
present: 
“The way it works here in Sea Gate, we’re grandfathered in here the way it was 
before, but the new owner, they are gonna pay what they are gonna pay in an A zone 
area, so what the hell could they charge? I hear people on the Bay streets, they wanted 
10 or 12 thousand dollars for flood insurance, so what the heck would you have here, 
and there they aren’t even going to flood?” 
This line of worry leads directly into the most recent update in the area, which is the 
aforementioned New York City appeal of FEMA’s floodplain mapping.  Inherent to Sea 
Gate’s geographic location as the jutting western edge of Coney Island is its potential for 
flooding, and Hurricane Sandy demonstrated aptly that in our new era of increasing climate 
instability and unpredictable storms, the potential for flooding is greater than ever before.  
FEMA’s floodplain mapping attested to this, but its conclusions were overturned successfully 
by the City government on the grounds that extensive predictions for future disaster would 
put undue burdens on the city and its residents.  This action has seen an immediate change 
come to homeowners in Sea Gate whose properties lie at the water’s edge.  Recently, one 
interviewee gave their appraisal of this shift: 
“I really couldn’t believe it.  Here we are, a stone’s throw from the water, and all of a 
sudden I’m ‘preferred non-risk’ according to my insurance company.  My flood 
premium’s gone down by thousands.  That’s great, to have less bills, but what does 
this mean for me?  Is that going to stop the next storm? I don’t think so, nothing has 
actually changed.  I didn’t know about the lawsuit or FEMA’s role until after this all 
happened, none of it was publicized, you didn’t see it in any news, you had to look it 
up for yourself, there was no engagement.” 
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And another respondent echoes this sentiment: 
“I feel betrayed, honestly.  Yeah, it’s great to see your bill go down but we are not 
low risk, we know that, anyone who was here for Sandy knows that.  You ask 
yourself why they would do this, and I can’t think of any good reason.  FEMA was 
just observing what actually happened to these parts, what will happen to the coast.  
These people in the city…I don’t think they are living in reality.  If they don’t think 
we are at risk, who is going to help us next time?”  Look at what happened out at 
Breezy Point…the whole place burned down.  How can they think places like this are 
lower risk than FEMA said?” 
Clearly, there was some sense of worry over the implications of this move, most importantly 
the primary fear being one of how it alters where the City will place Sea Gate in future plans 
if they are choosing externally to relate to it as a non-risk entity on a financial level. Such 
questions are highly relevant and this sentiment transitions well into what was gleaned from 
the data as being a part of the knowledge-base of the residents to whom I spoke on issues 
pertinent to Resilience both locally and within New York City at large. 
Resilience 
 Climate Awareness and Knowledge of Policy 
        Overall, residents to whom I spoke were highly conscious of the risks of residing near 
the sea.  In addition, most were largely aware of current state of climate science and the 
predominant ideas about how warming seas contribute to both rising sea levels and increased 
storm frequency and severity.  When asked about their awareness of such issues and how, if 
at all, they perceived them to effect Sea Gate, one respondent answered: 
“I actually will not stay here, I have since made plans to move. I now have a 
residence elsewhere, and from now on will not live in a coastal community for any 
reason. I do not feel that our population is aware of the risks and while homes are 
being bought and sold here and while houses are being rebuilt on stilts I think it is 
foolish to rebuild where nature will reclaim.” 
Another response shared this sentiment: 
“The risks from the water are absolutely high.  I no longer wish to reside here. It’s a 
big problem in my personal life that I am still living here. I want to leave, and it is 
imperative to me that I move my family out.” 
Yet another interviewee states: 
“It’s always a risk, it’s always a risk [living near the sea] and with Sandy we were a 
bit thrown off because, you know, we had Irene the year before which was like, you 
know was like a direct hit, and nothing happened. So then with Sandy, I think 
everyone was caught off guard…, they hadn’t got all their stuff out, and I got hit with 
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stuff like artworks and paperwork and stuff like that. And what I would have done 
was bring some stuff upstairs like computers and hard drives but that’s all gone…” 
Further still, another response explains: 
“Certainly, like, anytime a storm hits the Atlantic Coast it could be you, but this one 
was just like a weird everything conspired together so the water surge and we had the 
wind and it was rising and the tide was rising but there was also the Full Moon tide. 
And sometimes it’s gonna happen and you just hope…and lots of times we got real 
lucky, like hurricanes just stalled off the coast and they went away.  It would be naïve 
to say it couldn’t happen, and its just like denial if you think it isn’t going to happen 
again.” 
While all interviewees had a keen awareness that the sea posed a danger and a risk, and most 
had an awareness of climate change related issues, the connection between the two was not 
necessarily made.  For example, one respondent, who had previously elaborated on his/her 
risk from the sea also made the following statement: 
“I’m sure the climate changes, you know, however many umpteen thousands of years 
the climate is going to change, but I haven’t witnessed any climate change, it’s not 
apparent here. And, you know, supposedly the water level here is rising, but I can’t 
say that I’ve seen it.” 
This was a minority view to note.  When the connection between the two bodies of evidence 
was made, some respondents had high literacy in the pertinent information.  The following 
response illustrates a highly informed view: 
“Certainly, the risk is terminal.  I don’t think people will be able to live here much 
longer.  Not in your lifetime, maybe in mine, but I don’t want to stay here long term 
anymore.  I’ve been here for over 30 years, and it’s time to go.  Where am I going? 
Anywhere but the coast, maybe mountains.  With sea level rise and the storms that we 
could be in for down the line, a beach like this isn’t the place to be any longer. I have 
nightmares of the waves coming over the house. And this place is unique, there is 
nowhere else like this in the whole city with this view, this exposure.  The sea is the 
sea, though, and the city sure isn’t doing anything to help places like this.  They’ll 
take care of the public spaces but even then, what can they do? This was all water 
before, and it’s going to be again, I suppose.” 
        Having established a baseline understanding of where community awareness sat in 
regard to climate change, sea risk, and its related effects, the next task was to discern what 
level of knowledge, if any, was present amongst homeowners regarding the New York City 
Resilience plans emerging from the Office of the Mayor.  Furthermore, a secondary objective 
was to discover what level of engagement was perceived as currently existing between the 
crafters of said policies and the people whom they will affect.  When questioned about this 
topic, the first response garnered was: 
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“No, and the only thing that I heard Bloomberg say, when he was mayor before out 
esteemed DeBlasio came in was, he had looked at what they did in the 
Netherlands/Holland about putting up a wall somewhere over there so that the water 
would be…but that was just talk, like with what they’re saying now was there any 
money or anything, and as soon as he went, that went.  That’s the only thing I have 
heard. And if there were anything I would really be curious because I don’t think 
there is.” 
Yet another interviewee states: 
“Zero. There is zero engagement between the City and Private Sector and Citizens in 
regard to planning.  It’s sort of like the time when my wife had cancer and there were 
complications and the doctor told me ‘I can’t talk to you, you’re not a doctor.’ I was 
later told you would have had a wonderful case if your wife had died. But because 
she didn’t, since she was alive, he could say it was due to my work she didn’t die, 
because you can’t prove something like that…it’s like could I prove that that sand is 
gonna cause me damage so I can sue them? It’s like those catch 22’s.” 
This narrative of a communicatory blackout between private citizens (and specifically those 
in a coastal community like Sea Gate) and the directors of resilience policy within the city 
was consistent across all findings.  Of particular note also is the fact that despite its ubiquity 
in the field and the regularity with which the City of New York publishes policy packages 
containing the word, Resilience as a term denoting preparation for future climate impacts was 
a relatively unfamiliar concept to almost everyone with whom I spoke. This in and of itself 
denotes at least some level of information dissemination dysfunction in a municipality billed 
as a global resilience leader.  Another respondent stated: 
“Noone has spoken to us, not from the city directly.  Of course, we talked to some 
people from FEMA after the storm throughout the process of acquiring assistance, but 
never anyone directly involved with New York management.  And no information 
has been relayed to us, we don’t get any updates on what the city is doing.  For all 
intents and purposes, everything is back to as if Sandy had never happened.  
Occasionally you see the Army Corps. Of Engineers out in the water doing this or 
that, but they’ve been fiddling with the sand for years, so that is nothing new. 
Certainly if a storm had hit again this Fall we would have been every bit as 
susceptible as four years ago, nothing has changed.” 
Ultimately then, it seemed as though the perceived status of municipal activity veered 
towards stagnation, if not outright regression.  While the City of New York has indeed been 
active at least in a policy production manner, this form of activity has not trickled down to 
the ground level, and first-line victims of a lack of resilience building still view themselves as 
existing in an unchanged space comparative to before Sandy, if not a worse one. 
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Conclusions 
         Using the data presented above, a number of issues present in Sea Gate pose a 
significant challenge to the narrative of progressive resilience planning within New York 
City.  These are challenges that will need to be overcome if the city’s “resilience dividend” is 
ever to be met.  First and foremost, the issue of governance in times of crisis within New 
York is highly problematized by the residents within Sea Gate.  The scattered, piecemeal 
response to storm damage, displacement and service deprivation experienced by respondents 
to this study speaks to an underlying disorganization which mirrors previous accounts of 
governmental retreat and failure within the literature during scenarios such as Hurricane 
Katrina.  This endemic issue is further complicated by the status of Sea Gate as a private 
community within an already highly bureaucratic city, further saddled by its own 
dysfunctional internal administration.  This interplay serves to muddy the waters during the 
imminent aftermath of a natural disaster, and various organizations with ties to the 
community through either local or municipal chains of command were absent during 
Hurricane Sandy due to this. 
        Meanwhile, in the present, the most potent example of the local/municipal dichotomy in 
Sea Gate is seen in the contention over beach management, where the maintenance of sand-
bound property has become a battleground for citizen versus municipal rights to land.  While 
seemingly arbitrary, this issue has grave consequences for the future resilience of Sea Gate as 
a coastal entity.  The proper upkeep of the beach property on the Gravesend Bay facing shore 
of the community determines flood-based damage in the eyes of the homeowners currently 
sitting in the path of the sea.  Furthermore, a willingness to allow for this upkeep on the part 
of the City administration and the local Sea Gate Association will ultimately convey to 
homeowners whether the individuals and institutions of power present truly consider their 
plight worthy of stewardship, and thus this issue begs its own investigation, though it did not 
fit in this study. 
        Furthermore, levels of climate awareness in the respondent pool indicate that residents 
within Sea Gate are highly aware of both the current and future threats that the sea and 
environmental issues present to their households, financial stability, and ultimately, their way 
of life.  Some respondents felt this weight so severely that they now live in fear or are in the 
process of arranging to move away due to an overarching lack of confidence in the city to 
adapt to the precarious situation Sea Gate and other coastal communities like Breezy Point 
find themselves in across Brooklyn and Greater New York. 
        And yet, while all this is playing out, the City administration successfully appealed the 
status of Sea Gate and other coastal communities across New York City, altering their status 
and lowering their insurance premiums.  With this move, mixed emotions emerged from the 
community, who while glad to have lower payments were simultaneously confused by a 
scenario which did not line up with facts they knew to be self-evident.  The sea is as close as 
it has ever been, and homeowners are aware that another Hurricane Sandy could be just a 
season away, so they question what it means for them to have been listed as lower-risk in 
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regard to potential inundation.  As pointed out earlier, this action on the part of the NYC 
administration reeks of what Burby called the safe development paradox.  It would seem that 
the city is attempting to halt the potential deleterious economic effect that declaring the entire 
Brooklyn coastline a danger-zone could have by simply ignoring the problem.  Or at least 
that is what it looks like from the perspective of the people on the ground.  Properties are still 
being sold, developments still being undertaken, and areas which were flooded or burned to 
the ground in Sandy actively rebuilt and repopulated.  It is not a leap of logic to assume that, 
like Burby witnessed in the case of New Orleans, the short-term financial boom of positive 
development levels in potentially at-risk areas is outweighing the long-term goal of keeping 
communities safe from natural disasters and hazards. 
        This paper argues that the reality of coastal community experience as told by residents 
of Sea Gate presents a different view of a resilient New York City than the one present in 
former Mayor Bloomberg’s PlaNYC: A Stronger, More Resilient New York and now Mayor 
Bill DeBlasio’s One New York policy packages.  Certainly, this “real” New York also 
diverges greatly from their model The Rockefeller Foundation’s and Judith Rodin’s 
“resilience dividend”.  Due to this, changes need to be made as quickly as possible if the 
actual needs of coastal communities in New York City are to be met before the next Sandy 
comes along.  It is of primary importance that the City government take seriously the 
findings of the FEMA floodplain mapping which emerged after Hurricane Sandy, and 
benchmark administrative disasters such as Hurricane Katrina should provide ample evidence 
for the need of local officials to take heed of early warnings.  Furthermore, specifically to Sea 
Gate’s experience, the problematic relationship between the local homeowner’s association 
and the municipal government must be mediated and made more clear.  Perhaps, after 
decades of neglect, the beach management crisis currently unfolding could serve as the 
staging ground for building a more efficient and equitable system between the two parties.   
        Finally, I recommend that further research on the ecological history of Coney Island and 
other coastal areas of high population density which mirror Sea Gate’s precarious status 
could shed further light on the path that sensible resilience planning for these communities 
could take.  Interference by the Army Corps. Of Engineers over the years has fundamentally 
changed the topography of Sea Gate within the author’s lifetime, and the historical status of 
these coastlines must be taken into account when planning to protect them from future 
inundation.  As Cronon states, “An ecological history begins by assuming a dynamic and 
changing relationship between environment and culture, one as apt to produce contradictions 
as continuities.” (13)  This is a notion which is especially true in coastal cities, as a 
population’s relationship with the sea and coastal land is consistently shifting, evolving, and 
being engineered.  Certainly, this is true for New York where the coast has been dramatically 
expanded and much of the city today was once below water (Taylor 2012).  This leaves a 
multitude of people at the mercy of whatever may lie ahead, rather than sound policy and the 
safety that organization and government is supposed, at least in theory, to ensure. 
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        Ultimately, if the issues illuminated in this paper are not dealt with, serious backdraft in 
the form of unintended consequences and further disruption will be the legacy of current 
policy initiatives.  This would be a shame, for the ability of current municipal policy to meet 
these needs boils down to the simple responsibility of the City government to hear its 
constituents.  As this paper demonstrates, these stories are out there, people on the coast 
know the danger they face, and while “Cities” as conglomerate commercial and political 
entities seek to raise their profile in a burgeoning field, the true resilience of the most 
geographically vulnerable communities is being left up to chance. 
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